War Is Boring » Reich in Afghanistan

Wired.co.uk: U.K.-Style Surveillance State Spreads to Afghanistan

David Axe — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 03:13:54 +0000

by DAVID AXE and JASON REICH

There was a noise like a monstrous kettle boiling over, followed by a deep crunch, as the Chinese-made rocket arced through the sky and exploded on the flat, sandy ground. A couple of minutes later, two American mortar rounds punched the earth about three miles away from Combat Outpost Blackhawk, catching the five Taliban rocketeers as they scurried home. Three died. Two survivors scattered.

This counter-attack on the morning of August 15 was a rare victory for coalition forces, who are usually helpless to stop the Taliban shooters. Even if coalition troops see them coming, their rules of engagement – that is, the list of conditions governing the use of heavy weapons – often mean they can’t shoot back at all. “I took one look at our 25-page ROE book and said to myself, ‘I will never get to call in a fire mission here’,” grumbled US Army Sergeant Eric Kloberdantz, an artillery forward observer from the 10th Mountain Division, which provides the bulk of the troops for Wardak province.

In this case, the troops had been lucky. A tiny radar installed at the outpost had tracked the incoming rocket and extrapolated the launch point. They would normally have had to survey the location before firing mortars, to reduce the risk of hitting civilians, but the troops at Blackhawk had already mapped out the area and knew that no innocent Afghans lived anywhere nearby. Had the Taliban fired from a nearby village, surrounded by civilians, the coalition would have been powerless to strike back.

The relative helplessness of soldiers in Afghanistan could soon end. In the next few months, a surprisingly unwarlike piece of kit inspired by the CCTV cameras that have proliferated in British cities and beyond, might tip the odds in favour of successful coalition counter-strikes, while reducing further the risk to civilians. That, in turn, could help turn the tide against the Taliban in embattled provinces such as Wardak.

Cameras, infrared sensors and miniature radars, mounted in clusters to 30-metre towers or dangled from a 15-metre-long aerostat blimp, are giving more and more coalition troops such a precise view of Taliban shooters that coalition artillery and mortar crews will be cleared to fire back more often, confident that they won’t hit civilians.

Read the rest at Wired.co.uk.

(Photo: via Wired.co.uk)

Reich in Afghanistan: Afghan Gun Fun

David Axe — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 03:46:27 +0000

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by DAVID AXE

U.S. and French troops in Wardak, Afghanistan, use guns, mortars and grenades — first in training, then in combat. Jason Reich shot this footage in August 2009.

(Video: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Afghan Cop Training

David Axe — Mon, 21 Sep 2009 03:35:02 +0000

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by DAVID AXE

U.S. Army soldiers train Afghan National Police in techniques for searching detainees. The cops then try out their new skills in real-life missions. Jason Reich shot this footage in Wardak province, in August.

(Video: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Wardak Chopper Porn

David Axe — Sun, 20 Sep 2009 03:15:03 +0000

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by DAVID AXE

With roads made inaccessible by IEDs, helicopters are vital to U.S. efforts to defeat the Taliban in Wardak province, Afghanistan. Jason Reich collected this montage of chopper porn while embedded in the province in August.

(Video: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Deadlier IEDs, or Just Cheaper Ones?

David Axe — Fri, 18 Sep 2009 03:04:55 +0000

by JASON REICH

The Taliban are an adaptive and learning enemy. Soldiers in Afghanistan had been telling me this since I arrived in August. A report from The Washington Times, revealing the Taliban tactic of using “plastic” IEDs to avoid detection, illustrates this perfectly.

Over at Combat Outpost Blackhawk, where I was embedded with soldiers from the U.S. Army’s Task Force Spartan, I met a State Department police mentor who, in addition to his 25 years as a patrol officer in a large U.S. city, had spent three years in Iraq teaching Iraqi police counter-IED tactics. I’m not able to publish his name, but the grizzled 60-year-old-former Marine, who was in better shape than most of the soldiers I met, had a wealth of knowledge to share on the Taliban’s deadly, yet simplistic IED tactics.

Based on crater analysis that he conducted from IED strikes on our convoys, he noted that the explosive of choice for the Taliban in our area was ammonium nitrate, commonly found in fertilizer, which makes sense in this heavily farmed region. “Just because it’s not military-grade explosive doesn’t mean it’s any less deadly,” he explained to me. “It just means it’s more dangerous to work with.” That could explain the surprisingly frequent reports of “work accidents” that killed quite a few Taliban in Wardak earlier in the summer.

But the key element behind these plastic bombs is simply the delivery system: plastic jugs. The amount of metal required is minimal, since they are designed to destroy vehicles, not kill dismounted soldiers. You kill vehicles with blast, and soldiers with metal shrapnel. The IEDs targeting dismounts are smaller and even easier to make than vehicle-killing bombs. They are often just old Soviet mines planted at an angle towards the expected patrol. They don’t even need to be hidden, since they’re triggered a good distance away from the patrolling soldiers and rely on their shrapnel to do the damage.

The tactics and counter-tactics in the IED fight are always changing. As the summer draws to a close in Afghanistan, the Taliban seem to be one small step ahead.

(Photo: memorial service for Specialist Justine Pellerin, killed by an IED in Wardak; photo by Jason Reich)

The Washington Times: Afghan War Under-Resourced

David Axe — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 18:25:18 +0000

by JASON REICH

The sticky sweat on a stifling August night made it possible to periodically wipe mosquitoes from my face while crouching behind a bush.

Behind me sat a full infantry battalion. We lay in wait, listening to the sounds of a battle raging less than a mile away. A small team of enemy soldiers, probably no more than five men, had ambushed one of our convoys just up the road, but we were told to wait and not engage.

The problem was simple, if frustrating: There were too many different units in the area, and higher command was having trouble controlling them all. All we could do was sit and listen on the radio as the convoy duked it out with the enemy and screamed for the reinforcements that weren’t coming.

If this doesn’t sound much like the current war Afghanistan, that’s because it wasn’t. The Salouki Valley is in southern Lebanon and this incident took place in 2006, back when I was a soldier (pictured) instead of a freelance writer.

Israel had just sent 30,000 ground troops into southern Lebanon, an area about one-fiftieth the size of Afghanistan, to disarm the Iranian and Syrian-backed Lebanese militia, Hezbollah, and stop the group’s rocket fire on northern Israeli settlements. Despite massive Israeli firepower, neither objective was achieved. More than 100 Israeli soldiers and hundreds of Lebanese were killed.

This August, I was in Afghanistan as an embedded journalist working for U.S. and Israeli media. I found myself witnessing an equally frustrating military dilemma.

The parallels, and differences, between the Lebanon and Afghanistan wars reveal some potentially serious flaws in U.S. strategy.

On Aug. 20, election day, the Taliban were attacking polling stations in the Nerkh district of Wardak Province west of Kabul. The province is patrolled by elements of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division. The Afghan soldiers manning the polling stations had called for reinforcements, but the American troops I was with were powerless to help. There just weren’t enough soldiers.

Read the rest in The Washington Times.

(Photo: Jason Reich)

Voice of America: Implementing “Smart Power” in Afghanistan Poses Challenge for U.S.

David Axe — Wed, 16 Sep 2009 21:35:13 +0000

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by DAVID AXE and JASON REICH

Analysts and policy makers call it “smart power” — a seamless blend of investment, good deeds and military force that is intended to win friends while targeting enemies in war. In 2007, the U.S. Defense Department officially embraced this philosophy. But on the ground in Afghanistan, U.S. forces are finding it difficult to be humanitarians and builders as well as soldiers.

Soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division march into Kowt-e-Ashrow in Wardak Province, southwest of Kabul.

Wardak has seen bloody fighting in recent months as the Taliban expands its presence and U.S. reinforcements trickle in. Heavily armed American patrols are a common sight in local villages.

This day, Afghan and American soldiers have come bearing gifts.

School supplies for children, election materials for adults and tiny Afghan flags for everyone.

The aid is part of a two-year-old strategy for boosting the popularity of U.S.-led forces among everyday Afghans. It is an approach that the Pentagon and Army Command Sergent Major Andrew Spano of the 10th Mountain Division hope will turn the Afghan people against the Taliban.

Read the rest at Voice of America, or watch the video above.

(Video: Jason Reich)

World Politics Review: Remembering a Fallen Soldier

David Axe — Tue, 15 Sep 2009 03:04:26 +0000

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by DAVID AXE and JASON REICH

Elements of the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division are engaged in Afghanistan’s Wardak Province, southwest of Kabul. The division’s Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, lost 8 killed and 25 wounded in just three months in mid-2009. Twenty-one-year-old Spc. Justin Pellerin, who was killed by a roadside bomb blast in Afghanistan Aug. 20, is one such casualty. In the days following his death, Pellerin’s friends remembered him, and mourned his loss. David Axe and Jason Reich report for World Politics Review.

Reich in Afghanistan: “Elections Were a Joke”

David Axe — Fri, 21 Aug 2009 17:15:58 +0000

by DAVID AXE

“I’m dictating this message over the phone. I’m not in a place with any Internet access at all.”

So began War Is Boring correspondent Jason Reich’s message from Afghanistan. He was writing to get the news out, that despite NATO’s assertion that the election was “encouraging,” and Kabul’s claim that they represented a clear “success,” in Nerkh, where Reich accompanied U.S. troops providing broad election security, the vote was “a joke.” “My sources tell me that two people voted and there is very, very heavy fighting,” Jason wrote.

Expect more details once Jason has Internet access.

(Photo: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Calm Before the Storm

David Axe — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 20:27:23 +0000

by JASON REICH

The Afghan general elections are only hours away and the tension here in Wardak is on par with the soaring temperatures. In the past 24 hours, the almost daily rocket attacks have stopped, and the roads have been suspiciously clear of IEDs. These roads are free of traffic anyways, as the people here seem to be holding their collective breath, waiting for the 20th, and the elections, to arrive.

Yesterday, I sat in on a meeting between all of the forces responsible for securing the numerous polling stations here in the Nerkh district. The coalition has been insistent that it will play “no overt role” in the security of the polling stations, in order to remove any shred of a doubt that they are influencing the elections — so Afghan troops will be the only forces on site during the elections.

On the other hand, the organization and distribution of forces is still entirely American-led. At the district governor’s office sat the head of the Afghan National Army battalion, the chief of police and the district head of the National Directorate of Security, all ranked colonel or higher. From the coalition, there was a French captain and 25-year-old 1st Lieutenant Colin Riker, from Bravo Company 2/87 Infantry. Riker was the one really running the show. The reverse-hierarchy in this meeting is not uncommon in Afghanistan, where, despite all of its efforts to prove otherwise, the coalition still supersedes Afghan forces in nearly every command decision.

This puts a lot on Riker’s shoulders. He was promised dozens of new Afghan police recruits to help man the more distant polling stations in the district, but they are nowhere to be found. The only forces he does have in abundance, volunteer militiamen from the Afghan Public Protection Force, will likely “leave their posts after an hour or two, especially if there is fighting,” Riker said. According to the local ANA commander, there are certain polling stations, mostly out west, that are in villages completely controlled by the Taliban. “Not even 100 soldiers” would be enough to secure them.

“The decision to place extra polling stations in the more Taliban-friendly villages is a huge gamble for the Afghan government. They are betting on us to be able to secure them,” Riker said. The alternative — fewer polling stations located in safer areas — creates a different problem: traffic on the roads, which can easily be disrupted with IEDs, real or fake. The calculus behind securing dangerous polling stations instead of securing dangerous roads makes sense, at least in this part of the country, Riker said. “The Taliban know that their best weapon is the IED, so we are shifting the battle away from the roads and towards the polling stations. While it makes sense to have these extra polling stations to try to encourage voting, it’s essentially for naught because nobody will dare use them.”

Another tactic the Taliban uses a lot here in Wardak is intimidation. A new directive from the Taliban leadership warns that “any finger found with ink [from the polling stations] on it will be removed.” To counter this threat, Riker suggested that the polling stations should be supplied with alcohol swabs so that voters can remove the ink from their fingers after they leave the polls. When I mentioned to him that the purpose of the ink was to ensure that people don’t vote twice, he said, “I don’t care if they vote once, twice or ten times — I just need to demonstrate that voters in our district are safe.”

Convincing the locals here in Nerkh to get out and vote is going to be an uphill battle. This morning, the local Afghan contractors who work at the Combat Outpost refused to leave until after the elections. “There are new people coming into my village everyday — they are foreign fighters,” one contractor told me. “They will kill people for simply voting. Imagine what they would do to me if they knew I worked on an American base.”

(Photo: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Afghan Forces — the Good, the Bad and the Ugly

David Axe — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 03:53:11 +0000

by JASON REICH

Part one, the Afghan National Army

I was out on a daytime patrol with the soldiers of 4/25 Artillery and their Afghan National Army counterparts, when I overheard an interesting exchange. The ANA platoon leader, affectionately dubbed “Rambo” by the Americans, was expressing dissatisfaction with the U.S. soldiers’ house-clearing technique. Rambo argued that there were too many Americans in the courtyard of this khalat, and his men were not able to search it effectively.

The ISAF protocol for entering a khalat in Afghanistan is to have the Afghanistan National Police enter first, followed by the ANA, while the Americans guard the perimeter. The Americans rarely ever content themselves to simply guarding the perimeter, however, and usually sweep their way through the entire structure “in order to establish proper over-watch,” one U.S. commander explained to me.

For all of its tactical prowess, I can understand why the ANA commander disagrees with the U.S. approach. The body language of urban warfare, even when the bullets aren’t flying, is extremely intimidating to anyone who sees a squad of American soldiers stacked shoulder to shoulder, rifles at the ready.

What made this exchange particularly enlightening, though, was the American’s positive reaction. “Okay, you’re the boss,” was all the U.S. commander said, as he pulled most of his men back to the outer perimeter. “We trust these guys,” he told me. “If they feel they are ready to start taking more responsibility, and they don’t endanger my men in the process, then I encourage it wholeheartedly.”

“These aren’t your average ANA,” explained Sergeant E. Kloberdantz back at Combat Outpost Conlon. “These guys are squared away. [They are] almost like real soldiers.”

Of the many ANA the men of 4/25 have worked with in the course of their deployments, the group they are with now at COP Conlon are amongst the best, they say. More importantly, the Americans trust the Afghans enough to let them take the lead on certain missions. Perhaps the best example of this is their participation in the daily Route Clearance Package (RCP), where soldiers check road culverts for IEDs. It’s an extremely dangerous mission, and the ANA soldiers who do it — in soft-skinned pickup trucks, no less — have had many close calls. In one week, they discovered three IEDs, two of which were triggered as they arrived. With perforated eardrums and a few minor concussions, they were back on RCP the very next day.

This is the only place in Afghanistan that I know of where the ANA takes a lead role in what is considered the most important security procedure for a COP. Speaking to soldiers outside of Conlon, I learned that most Americans don’t trust their ANA detachments enough to let them do RCP. Here at Conlon, there is a different attitude, and it speaks to the potential for a self reliant Afghan National Army — sooner than many think. “They’ve found IEDs before we have — that isn’t easy to do,” said Sgt. Kloberdantz. “Anytime someones saves your life, you tend to like them.”

I asked the battery commander, Captain Brian Moran, about what measures could be taken to spread around the experience and professionalism of these ANA soldiers to other provinces — or to other units, such as the ANP. He said that the Afghan National Security Forces are “hit or miss,” and there is really nothing a small unit commander like himself can do except “work with what I am given. In this case, I got lucky.”

The civilians in Jalrez district seem to take kindly to the ANA. In one extreme case, I saw a taxi driver who did not slow down at a checkpoint get pulled from his car and beaten rather savagely by the ANA, only to get up, brush the dust off his clothes and shake the hands of the ANA soldiers while apologizing profusely for his error. The main reason the villagers here seem to tolerate the ANA’s presence is that “they protect us from the police,” as one village elder told me. Out of the three elements making up the Afghan National Security Forces, it seems the ANA are the “good guys” of the bunch.

But they still have room for improvement. The Americans at Conlon remain skeptical of a fully independent ANA, at least for the near future. “As much as we love them, these guys are still ANA,” quipped one soldier. “They bring cots and mattresses up to their guard tower, for God’s sake.”

In part two of this series, I will address the many shortcomings of the Afghan National Police. And, in part three, the mysteries of the Afghan Public Protection Force.

(Photo: Jason Reich)

Reich in Afghanistan: Security and Governance in Wardak

David Axe — Tue, 18 Aug 2009 08:46:26 +0000

by JASON REICH

I’ve come here to Wardak province, southwest of the capital, to gauge how well the coalition provides basic security and governance in the Afghan government’s own backyard. I’m embedded with the U.S. Army’s Task Force Spartan, composed primarily of soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division. These troops represent the spearhead of the “Afghanistan surge,” which has moved troops into Wardak districts that haven’t seen foreign soldiers since the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. For the first two weeks of my embed, I linked up with 4th Battalion of the 25th Artillery, tasked with improving governance in Wardak. After that, I headed to the 2nd Battalion of the 87th Infantry, which handles local security.

The moment I arrived at 4/25’s Combat Outpost (COP) Conlon, it was clear I would be seeing more security operations than anything else. As I arrived, the battery commander was busy guiding three CH-47 helicopters onto a small landing strip outside the COP. The helos came in so low and so fast that they knocked one of the satellite dishes off of the roof of the command post and onto the steps where I was waiting. Someone shouted, “Welcome to Conlon!”

Arriving on the Chinooks was a group of Special Forces soldiers tasked with a capture/kill mission near the COP. Before I could even introduce myself to the soldiers of 4/25, I was ushered onto a waiting MRAP and whisked out on that mission. After only a few hours, and a brief burst of gunfire, we got reports that the SF guys had gotten their man. The local Taliban cell leader, known only as Wazir, was the man allegedly responsible for a devastating IED that killed four soldiers from 4/25 only a week earlier. Judging from a grainy picture and vague biometrics they had, the body of the man lying in front of them seemed to be Wazir’s. A week later we learned otherwise. The man killed in that operation was Wazir’s brother, and Wazir is still at large.

I spent two weeks with the “governance” battalion of Task Force Spartan, but I saw hardly any governance work. The operational tempo just didn’t leave them enough time or manpower. The under-manned battery’s two platoons were busy either clearing the road of IEDs or working on the COP’s defenses. That isn’t to say that there was no progress at all. I saw a humanitarian mission in the village of Khowt-e-Ashrow, where soldiers delivered school supplies to the local children, and a key-leader engagement, where the village elders consulted with the battery commander on how to spend the $15,000 in reconstruction funds for their district. (Village elder meeting pictured.)

Now I’ve joined up with Bravo Company of the 2/87 Infantry, at COP Blackhawk, to see how security operations are run when you’ve got a fully staffed, dedicated infantry company. COP Blackhawk is right outside the village of Nerkh, a much hotter area than Conlon. This COP gets rocketed almost every day. And unlike the frustrated artillerymen of 4/25, these guys get to shoot back — a lot. With the elections just around the corner, this district will be a key indicator of just how well the Afghan government and the coalition can secure the rural polling stations. While fighting rages in the southern provinces, here, just 50 kilometers outside of Kabul, the insurgency is simmering. According to the men of Bravo Company, it’s just a matter of days until it boils over.

(Photo: Jason Reich)