Via Atlantic Sentinel.

by BALAJI CHANDRAMOHAN

George K. Tanham, a famous American military historian once said, “India doesn’t have a strategic culture.” In other words, India doesn’t have a strategy to project its power beyond the confines of the subcontinent. This shows a defensive realism on the part of Indian policy makers.

India had succumbed to numerous invasions from its northwest before it was colonized by the British for more than two centuries. The inability of Indian policy makers to understand what is happening around them in the world and formulate policies in accordance has been lacking since the days of Alexander the Great. Even if the Arthashastra, an ancient Indian text on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy was written in the wake of Alexander’s invasion, the art of successful statecraft was forgotten by subsequent Indian rulers.

Things have changed in recent years. India today is a nuclear weapons state; it has acquired great power status and aspires to permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council.

If India is just not rising but already had risen as President Barack Obama professed in his speech before the Indian Parliament last month, the country has a responsibility to project its power beyond South Asia.

For that to happen, India needs a blueprint. In statecraft, that is called strategy and if implemented, a strategic doctrine. Countries as China, the United Kingdom and the United States have national strategies and white papers which guide their military doctrines. Military doctrine is key to successful military planning and weapons procurement. It makes a country’s actions more predictable while the strategic debate will revolve around the strategic doctrine.

India clearly lacks such an articulated doctrine and this has left both policy makers and the military wandering on a path that leads nowhere. Top level strategists in India have to start thinking about their country’s future and its defense.

India claims that its military doctrine has moved to a “proactive” and “offensive” approach in recent decades. The Indian Army doctrine released in 2004 has popularly been dubbed as “Cold Start.” Though officially the army denies it, India does have plans to attack Pakistan and occupy the country with minimal civilian losses. Indeed, last month, while Obama toured the region, Pakistan said that it was because of the Cold Start doctrine that it needs to keep troops stationed on the western frontier which thus cannot engage in combating the Taliban along the Afghan border.

India’s contentious doctrine was framed after the India-Pakistan military standoff in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The army immediately mobilized under the code named “Operation Parakram” but the international community intervened to stop Indian troops from advancing into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. India then understood the need for a strategy which could produce swift results in penetrating Pakistan before any intervention from the international community, including the United States, could prevent it.

With this in mind, India framed the Indian Army Doctrine 2004. The Army Doctrine is updated every five years and has two parts. The first is accessible and declassified while the second is kept secret. Pakistan claims that these classified plans entail Cold Start.

Then there is a classified Joint Warfare Doctrine which was formulated in 2006 and includes the doctrine of the three services of army, navy and air force. The air force has its own doctrine which, too, is classified, however the Naval Doctrine, or Maritime Doctrine, is not.

Then there is a subconventional warfare doctrine for responding to terror provocations emanating from Pakistan, prescribing the use of “surgical strikes” and action on the Line of Control in Kahsmir.

With respect to China, India doesn’t have any concrete plans even if both political and military planners are worried about the possibility of having to wage a war on two fronts against both China and Pakistan. Logically, a two front strategy would first involve making thrusts into Pakistan in accordance with Cold Start to quickly shift the war effort to the eastern Himalayas facing China.

India claims to have attained the necessary nuclear deterrence however its Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999 calls for the use of conventional forces before deploying atomic weapons. Against this background, one can understand a point made by American political scientist John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). He believes that great powers are feared not because of their nuclear weapons but because of their ability to project their armed forces beyond their borders. Mearsheimer cites the example of the Soviet Union and forces the argument that it was the Red Army that was feared in the Western Europe, not so much the Soviets’ nuclear arsenal. Indian policy makers needs to understand this and can’t sit with the fact that India clearly lacks a doctrine that ignores the worst case scenario of a two front war.

One country that used to be in a similar position was early twentieth century Germany. Like India, it faced the prospect of a two front war, against both France and Russia. The famous Schlieffen Plan called for the quick elimination of France before venturing into the Russian heartland. But the military strategy was not backed up with sound German politics and diplomacy. That is another key lesson India must learn.

Unfortunately, the political establishment’s response to the army’s initiative has been limited. It should pursue a “whole of government approach” to balance diplomacy, the relative weight of the three armed services and conventional capability versus strategic deterrence.

If India intends to play a greater political role in the Asia Pacific, it has to fully exploit the advantages of its continental and maritime geography and prepare for the worst case scenario. A good first step would be appointing a Chief of Defense Staff as recommended by the Group of Ministers. Although a decade has passed since that recommendation, politicians in India have so far refrained from creating the position. A Chief of Defense Staff would ensure greater cooperation among the armed services, the bureaucracy and the political leadership however, especially in times of crisis. In general, a paradigm shift has to occur in India’s strategic thinking from defensive realism to offensive realism.

Originally published at Atlantic Sentinel.

by ZACH ROSENBERG

Today is Veteran’s Day, when Americans honor their military veterans and the sacrifices they have made. People celebrate in different ways, and as with most holidays, some are more observant than others. I, for example, will write this post, think about those who have made sacrifices on my behalf, make pasta for dinner, and watch an episode or two of Generation Kill. Others are standing in the cold rain in Arlington National Cemetery. Others are on patrol in Afghanistan, where some will likely be bombed or shot at.

Heroism is a nebulous concept of subjective application, but it’s one that many Americans bestow on all U.S. veterans. In addition to praising veterans in my own way, I want to impart my view, which is that being a veteran of military service is not automatic grounds for heroism, and that heroism is not necessarily tied to armed service. Where to draw the line is relative and varies from person to person.

I don’t want to insult or anger anyone, I’m genuinely curious about what people think. I want to put a couple of questions to readers:

What actions define heroism in the service of others? Is it sacrifice or service?

How does the cause served impact the definition? A just vs. a mistaken war? Would a particularly brave Taliban fighter qualify under your definition? Were there more heroes in the Union than the Confederacy?

What level of service does it require? Is it only armed deployment abroad, or would the mail sorting platoon qualify? What about an armed FBI agent? What about an unarmed IRS agent or SEC regulator?

(Painting: Legends of America)

[kml_flashembed movie="http://www.youtube.com/v/Uj2DiuZb0b4" width="425" height="350" wmode="transparent" /]

Whether on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, or on the waters off of Somalia, the reality of today’s conflicts have exposed gaps in our tactical thinking and operational approach to waging war.

The responses have combined doctrinal evolutions and operational innovations, demonstrating once again the strategic asset represented by American ingenuity and creative thinking. But they have also generated a passionate and at times heated debate, both within the military and the academy. In our first set of biweekly feature articles centered around a theme, WPR takes a look at the Future Face of Conflict, in an effort to put those debates in context.

Among the debut pieces are my piracy feature from two weeks ago, plus a new look at Human Terrain System written by my good friend Paul McLeary. “Besieged by all the wheeling and dealing, the Americans never notice an old man who, instead of approaching them to join in the hard bargaining, sits off by himself in the corner of the room,” Paul writes of soldiers in Iraq. “And in ignoring him, the Americans miss a chance to affect real change in the neighborhood.”

The old man from the vignette, of course, is the real sheik, the neighborhood power broker who, in Iraqi society, doesn’t approach people, but rather lets people approach him. And the vignette is the story of the first four years of the Iraq War.

(Photo: me)

My students and I fight, on a daily basis, our campaign against dangling modifiers and other such manifestations of slack-mindedness (many of you military types fear Al Qaeda; I fear the dangling modifier and its awful cousin the lazy modifier, the two suicide bombers of effective communication).

I witnessed and participated in my first Steel Beach yesterday. I found it disconcerting to no longer be the only one in mismatched beachwear.

There was of course one casualty.

The football will be missed.

It recognizes that military means alone are not sufficient to resolve these conflicts and that landpower, while critical, is only one element of a broader campaign that represents the application of all the elements of national power. Because of this, Army doctrine now gives equal importance to tasks focused on the population — stability or civil support — as it does to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents. While defeating the enemy with offensive and defensive operations, Army forces simultaneously shape the broader situation through stability actions to restore security and normalcy to the local populace. Soldiers operate in and among the people of the world, not adjacent to them or above them. They often face the enemy among noncombatants, with little to distinguish one from the other. Killing or capturing the enemy while in proximity to noncombatants complicates land operations exponentially. Winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not sufficient.

The new doctrine will result in the Army fielding more civil affairs and special forces units at the expense of traditional heavy armor and artillery units. Perhaps most importantly, the manual authors envision 100-person teams of cultural experts deploying all over the world, immersing in local cultures in order to provide expert advice in the event of a crisis that requires Army intervention in the region.

Compare this to the Air Force’s recent strategic white paper (pdf!) penned by Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley, which continues to prioritize conventional combat with high-tech enemies. The Air Force’s envisioned primary threat?

Ascendant powers — flush with new wealth and hungry for resources and status — are posturing to contest U.S. superiority. These adaptive competitors are translating lessons from recent conflicts into new warfighting concepts, capabilities and doctrines specifically designed to counter U.S. strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. They are advancing in all domains. For example:
• “Generation 4-plus” fighter aircraft that challenge America’s existing “4th Generation” inventory — and, thus, air superiority — with: overwhelming numbers and advanced weaponry; sophisticated integration of electronic attack and advanced avionics; emerging low-observable technologies; and progressive, realistic, networked training
• Increasingly lethal, integrated air defense systems (IADS) that threaten both our Airmen and aircraft, and could negate weapons used to suppress or destroy these systems
• Proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles with growing range, precision, mobility, and maneuverability — capable of delivering both conventional and non-conventional warheads.

So who’s right? The Army recognizes that “chaos is the enemy.” The Air Force, on the other hand, believes that well-armed nation states are the big bad. But even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates says insurgencies represent war’s future.

If so, we’re screwed. Seven years after the launch of Wikipedia — the user-edited online encyclopedia that brought the “open source” concept to the masses — the U.S. Army is still playing catch-up. The Army’s idea of harnessing the ‘net is to launch isolated websites, put generals in charge and lock everything behind passwords, while banning popular open-source civilian websites. Colonel James Galvin, head of the Army’s “Battle Command Knowledge System,” openly admits that when it comes to the collaborative internet, the bad guys have a “niche advantage.”

It didn’t have to be this way. Around four years ago there was a grass-roots explosion of informal web-based tools for soldiers. Four captains at West Point founded companycommand.com as a forum for junior officers to swap battlefield lessons. And the 1st Cavalry Division launched CAVNET to sponge up and spread patrol tactics in Iraq. Both were victims of their own successes.

Galvin’s office, located at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas, was set up to institutionalize these forums and others. To the Army, that meant hiding them all behind the password-protected Army Knowledge Online web portal, and assigning trained moderators and high-ranking “sponsors” to each site. The result is forums that are less accessible, less nimble, less innovative and less effective than their counterparts in the shadowy world of terrorists and insurgents. Oh, and there still aren’t any official Army wikis.

Besides adhering to strict security standards, Galvin stresses that the Army must also balance “both hierarchy and networking.” “If you’ve got hierarchy, you’ve got direction — and if you bring in networking, you’ve got direction and collaboration.” But limiting collaboration to AKO password-holders artificially shrinks the network, and makes the whole process perhaps too insular to be truly innovative. I’m not saying that Army forums should be totally unprotected from insurgent snoopers. But they should be expanded, and loosened, to allow students, academics, journalists and, yes, even members of the general public to participate on some level. That’s risky, sure, but worth it.

Galvin advises patience. “Our leaders are getting comfortable working in that [collaborative] environment,” he says. And that means Army wikis aren’t far off. But even if they arrived tomorrow, they’d still be seven years late.

It’s been a tough fight for DeKort. But last week he was finally formally recognized for his labors. Representative Elijah Cummings, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, presented DeKort the Society on Social Implications of Technology’s [IEEE] public service award. Said Cummings of DeKort:

When he saw faulty equipment being installed on the 123-foot patrol boats by Lockheed Martin, his employer, he took his concerns up the entire chain of the company’s ethics department, and he eventually took his concerns to the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General and even to the Internet.  His persistence helped get critical information on the 123s into the hands of our Committee and this information formed a central part of our 10-hour hearing on the Deepwater program.

Through his actions, Mr. DeKort embodied dedication to excellence. … In addition to bringing to light information on faults within the 123s, I am certain that another result of Mr. DeKort’s action and of the Congressional oversight that it helped spur has been to improve the management of the Deepwater program, and to lead to the imposition of more rigorous standards for the equipment purchased under the program. … 

The Coast Guard and the [Lockheed and Northrop Grumman] team are now taking great pains to ensure that the new National Security Cutter – the most expensive asset to be procured under Deepwater – is rigorously tested before the government takes delivery of this asset.  The Coast Guard has also announced that it will take the lead systems integration function back in house rather than leaving it with private sector contractors.

Like previous winners of the Barus award, Mr. DeKort’s commitment to excellence came at a cost to him personally, and yet it was a cost that he was willing to bear to do what he believed was right.  Had everyone involved in the Deepwater program approached the program with the same commitment Mr. DeKort brought, we would not have had the failures in the program that we have experienced.

In closing, I also applaud IEEE for giving this award today, and for their work to recognize integrity in public service.  It pains me deeply that our country has come now to tolerate mediocrity, for mediocrity threatens our greatness as a nation.

Kind words, but Cummings speaks too soon. While the Coast Guard has learned lessons from the investigations DeKort helped launch, one of those lessons was how to cover your ass. If rumors are true, the service is considering rejecting the first of the 300-foot National Security Cutters — the future crown jewels of the Coastie fleet — because Northrop and Lockheed botched the design, construction and electronics … all while insisting that everything was just dandy (pdf!). 

But the Coast Guard is just as guilty. For years it let industry run its modernization programs while the service sat back and pretended that there wouldn’t be problems. Rejecting the cutter, DeKort says, is the Coast Guard’s way of distancing itself from the coming programmatic meltdown.

[Aung] Din’s people relay the coordinates of potential trouble spots. [Lars] Bromley’s team bids for satellite time. The resulting imagery — if not spoiled by cloud cover or fast-growing vegetation — is compared to years-old archives of imagery in order to perform “change-detection,” a tactic also employed by military reconnaissance experts looking for evidence of hidden weapons, moving vehicles or recently buried bombs. AAAS prepares the findings for distribution in the form of paper reports or electronic press releases.

So what’s up with Burma?

“A military state since 1962, Burma’s ruling junta continues to clash with the National League for Democracy,” the group states:

A new analysis of high-resolution satellite images … pinpoints evidence consistent with village destruction, forced relocations, and a growing military presence at 25 sites across eastern Burma where eye-witnesses have reported human rights violations. … AAAS precisely mapped the locations of 31 of some 70 reported human rights violations by comparing field notes with information provided by the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Satellite image analysis then revealed physical evidence to corroborate reported instances of human rights violations at 25 of the 31 accurately mapped sites. Wherever possible, Bromley compared archival satellite images with newly acquired shots to examine sites before as well as after the reported military activity. In other cases, recent images revealed clear signs of destruction.

AAAS has also helped track conflicts in Darfur and Zimbabwe (depopulation of a village pictured).

Update 13:22 EST: EurekAlert has before and after pics from Burma here. 

Related:
A.F. general: space is for peace (part one)
Space is for peace (part two)
Geeks spot Fossett?
A.F. Fossett search turns up everything but Fossett