The formal acceptance of the new U.S. Coast Guard National Security Cutter Bertholf, slated for last week, was supposed to be good news for the nation’s troubled fifth military service. Instead, the 5,000-ton ship — the largest and potentially most powerful vessel in Coast Guard history — has become another chapter in the mounting scandal surrounding the service’s $25-billion Deepwater modernization program. Deepwater, launched in 2002, aims to build new ships and airplanes and connect them all with a secure, electronic command-and-control network using common components. But the program has suffered cost increases and delays and has resulted in several lawsuits.
Last week at the Bertholf’s scheduled acceptance, the Coast Guard declined to sign the “DD250″ forms that accompany any handover of major defense items from the manufacturer. The refusal to sign is apparently related to the discovery that Bertholf’s electronics are, as predicted by critics, vulnerable to leaks. This was a problem originally identified on faulty 123-foot boats by Lockheed whistleblower Mike DeKort and initially denied by the Coast Guard, then later acknowledged in the course of congressional and internal investigations. Now it appears that the network vulnerabilities, and by extension many of Deepwater’s most vexing problems, are rooted in a single illegal act by a Coast Guard official.
Ron Porter, a civilian Coast Guard employee, four years ago issued waivers to paper over known network problems with the 123-foot boats. “He waived — accepted — systems with critical security failures that were pointed out by the Navy,” DeKort said of Porter. “Since this is a system of systems design, that meant the NSC had to use common designs, systems and equipment as the 123s. The 123s set the pattern.”
Read the whole story over at World Politics Review.
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David – for what it’s worth, you likely destroyed Mr. Porter who is at the bottom of the food chain in this blunder. As for Jim Atkinson who I’ve know about for years since he compromised a number of sensitive DoD projects…check your sources for now on before hanging someone out to roast like that. It will go far in sustaining a good reputation in the field. Journalist like you need to go after the big dogs and in the case of Deepwater fiasco, the trail leads to the very top. Instead, you made the GS-13/14 the fall-guy who is now walking the streets of DC looking for employment…nice!! Now where’s your intestinal fortitude?
Gunner,
Thanks for the input.
Note that Atkinson says in the story that this Tempest issue starts way above Porter’s pay grade. The point is that Porter was a key node in the trickling down of bad behavior, and he could have stopped it. He chose not to. As for those above him: their time is coming. Deepwater’s problems are undeniable. Congress and the media are investigating. Heads will roll.
[...] It’s old news by now that the Coast Guard’s flagship, 5,000-ton National Security Cutters are messed-up ships, with structural flaws and leaky electronic networks. Eight of the 400-foot vessels were planned, but cost increases, from $250 million to around $400 million for the first in the class, have long caused insiders to speculate that the Coast Guard would shrink the program. Sure enough, Navy Times just broke the story that an internal Coast Guard study raises the possibility of trading out NSCs for the smaller, yet-to-be designed Offshore Patrol Cutter (concept pictured): The report does acknowledges other early “issues” for the [NSC 1] Bertholf and the next ship in the class, the Waesche – including cost bumps and questions about hull strength — but concludes “no other candidate could meet the speed, sea-keeping and endurance” the Coast Guard needed. [...]
[...] Last week the Coast Guard published a faked first-person testimony on its official “Coast Guard Journal” blog over at http://www.uscg.mil. “Transparency breeds corrective behavior,” is a favorite saying at Coastie HQ in the wake of the $100-million scandal over botched 123-foot patrol boats. In the interest of some “corrective behavior,” here’s how that the faked blog went down, as best as I can tell from various confidential and public sources: [...]
[...] Coast Guard acquisitions chief Gary Blore [...]
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Do NSC 2 and 3 share the exact same design with NSC 1? Or have their designs been altered based on lessons learned during Bertholf’s construction and trials? If the designs have been altered, what are the major changes? [...]