It seemed like such a small thing. Royal Air Force security troops patrolling the outskirts of Basra air station in southern Iraq on December 17 leaped out of their new Mastiff armored trucks (that’s an MRAP to us Americans) in order to scout out a bridge before the lumbering blast-proof vehicles crossed. One of the 34 Squadron troopers noticed something he didn’t recall seeing before: a crack in the concrete near the far side.
He pointed it out to Flight Lieutenant Edward Cripps, who eyed the idling Mastiffs, their drivers waiting for the all clear. This is what happens, Cripps mused aloud, when you repeatedly drive 30-ton trucks over a bridge designed for much lighter vehicles. “We’ll have to keep an eye on this,” he said. But for now the bridge was sound, and an officer gestured for the Mastiffs to cross.
A small thing, to be sure, but the over-burdened bridge is just one consequence of the changing nature of British military operations in southern. Two years ago, nimble, lightly-equipped British forces pursued a counter-insurgency strategy grounded in decades of operational experience — and with unusual effectiveness. (See videos here and here.) So much so that heavy, aggressive U.S. forces adopted British methods when they launched their much-vaunted “surge” campaign to re-take Baghdad from insurgents.
Today, the British counter-insurgency operation has ended –- some say prematurely –- and the units slated to remain in Iraq as an “overwatch” force have adopted heavier, less agile weapons systems, such as the Mastiffs, and fortified themselves at the air station. In doing so, they become less viable against low-intensity threats and, ironically, more vulnerable overall. British forces in essence are making the same mistake their American counter-parts did in the first three years of the Iraq war: they have confused “force protection” with effectiveness.
The British Mastiffs tear down city power and telephone lines, damage buildings and parked cars and over-stress dilapidated Iraqi bridges — but only when they leave the confines of an increasingly fortified Basra air station, which now they rarely do. British troops’ confinement, ostensibly for their own protection, means they have become static targets for a population that they decline to engage, or understand, as they await the decision, likely still months or even years away, to entirely withdraw from Iraq.
Read the whole story over at World Politics Review.
Related posts:
- India Needs Armored Trucks to Counter Naxalite Bombs
- Flashback: After the Surge: Is the British Withdrawal from Southern Iraq a Model for U.S. Forces?
- World Politics Review: Improvised Bombs Complicate Afghan War Effort
- Do Working Men Rebel? Study on Joblessness and Insurgency Leads to Surprising Results
Very nice reading.
Also, those big vehicles suck down more fuel making the logistical tail more expensive. A big difference in MPG compared to a Rover.
I read the whole article and you seem to confuse the order of events. One of the reasons for a role back of forces in Iraq were the mounting casualties with the resultant loss of appetite, the majority of these casualties coming from soldiers being transported in lightly protected Snatch Land Rovers. Yes to travel protected and then dismount and patrol is the ideal, our soldiers were not travelling protected. You should speak to the multitude of badly maimed British and American soldiers who were transported poorly protected and argue your point with them.
Oh and British troops still patrol dismounted (Afghanistan)
Your observations seem very one sided, and take a narrow point of view?
There is nice rebuttal of Davids article in World Politics Review at EU Referendum
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/
I guess the bottom line is the British have not been effective in Basra for a long time. MRAP,s really have had nothing to do with the mess the British are leaving in Basra.
The British due the lack of political support of their public at home for the war in Iraq have had a policy of withdrawing troops regardless of the situation on the ground. This is not a example we should follow.