An after-action review (PDF!) conducted by NATO’s stabilization force in Afghanistan highlights the risks posed by the alliance’s current firepower-heavy methods for combating a resurgent Taliban. The report was published in July but has only now become available to the press. I was there in June when a combined Dutch and Afghan force beat back an attack by at least 500 Taliban fighters at the mouth of the Chora Valley, in Uruzgan province. As many as 100 civilians died in the fighting, some or all of them in intensive artillery and air barrages by Dutch forces, including attacks by Apache helicopters and F-16s. The Dutch task force’s single PzH-2000 self-propelled howitzer also played a major role in the battle, firing rocket-boosted rounds steadily for two days.
The report echoes the Dutch commander’s claim that the Taliban was responsible for most of the civilians killed, but also quotes Afghan survivors and officials blaming ISAF for the casualties. “The case shows an urgent need to re-asses some of ISAF’s more heavy-handed tactics,” the report contends. At risk is NATO’s fragile relationship with the Afghan population. But coalition forces in Uruzgan have only added firepower since the report’s publication. Australian troops partnered with the Dutch have gained a mortar team – this despite rules of engagement that prohibited them from participating in the Chora battle – and U.S. forces in the area recently debuted the MQ-9 Reaper hunter-killer drone in the attack role. In a bid to boost accuracy, the Dutch F-16s are swapping LANTIRN targeting pods for more accurate Litening AT Block II pods.
Related:
Dutch battle Taliban
Where were the Aussies? Oh, here
Where were the Aussies?
Civilian deaths in Tarin Kowt battle
Iraqi civilian deaths up
Air Force gunships to the front of U.S. strategy?
Grieve for your dead, then get back to work
Related posts:
- U.S. Helicopter Raid Kills 27 Afghan Civilians
- Interview with Dutch Major General Mart de Kruif, Former Commander, Regional Command South — Part One
- The Hague Online: Brothers in Arms
- World Politics Review: Dutch Government Mulls Departure from Afghan War
- Defense Update: Psyops and the Battle for Marjah
- Recalling the Battle of Chora, Part One
The Dutch/ANA/ANP/ and anti taliban civilians were clearly in danger of being over run and slaughtered.
The Dutch basically two choices, leave or fight. Both options would have lead to civilian deaths.
Putting a 155mm fire mission into a built up area sounds bad but if the potential alternative is worse, what do you do?
I think you are doing the Dutch a disservice by the tone of this post. Clearly by their actions they are one of the least aggressive participants in this war and the civilian deaths would have greatly upset them. Unlike others they understand the concept of winning hearts and minds as you know.
I reckon Karzai would have been more upset if Chora had fallen.
And as you pointed out they are doing something by deploying more accurate weapons. Perhaps more AC-130s would be better though.
L1A1,
The article isn’t slanted at all. He encourages you to read the PDF by providing a link that isn’t hidden away. If you read the PDF you can see the matter is still under investigation. However, the actions of the ISAF still indicate that they are a little heavy handed… which they seem to admit in the report.
The Taliban knows that this is an unpopular war in many places withing the NATO nations…. they know if they can smear the ISAF enough they’ll just simply leave.
Don’t get me wrong I like and appreciate David’s blog and his writing but in this instance I think the title is the literary equivalent to a knife in the guts.
The major missing element here is the analysis of the situation requiring the use of the firepower.
The alternative headline could have been:
“Taliban Kill Civilians, NATO Does Nothing, Feels Bad”.
Now who wants to be a Dutch commander?
[...] It is not just the Air Force, Army, and Navy that has head shakingly ineffective contracting systems: the US Coast Guard does as well. Axe also discusses the same consequence of our misguided airpower campaign in Afghanistan that I do: massive civilian casualties, the mention of which to many pro-war types and soldiers tends only to elicit shrugs. Yet we persist in being surprised when they are decidedly apathetic about Bush’s freedom agenda. [...]
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