By KEVIN KNODELL
In Vietnam, the measure by which the military defined success was the number of enemy killed. These decisions were mostly made by senior officers who’d fought in World War II or Korea, and had little understanding of the way the Vietcong guerrillas operated. This put incredible pressure on the grunts who went about hunting an invisible enemy that hid in jungles, tunnels and villages. It also led to a general disinterest in — and in some cases, disregard for — the local population.
This “by-the-numbers” approach is one of the most commonly cited flaws when I’ve talked to veterans of the Vietnam War. So it was with great dismay that I learned that the U.S. Army has begun using body counts as a measure of success in Afghanistan. Tim Lynch at Free Range International said that this is an indication that “the U.S. Army is at the end of its Big-Box FOB micro-managing rope.”
In counter-insurgency, success comes from killing or capturing high-value targets like bomb makers, foreign trainers, and money handlers, not killing the desperate people these bad guys have turned into cannon fodder. Success comes from winning the support of the locals and giving them hope, to turn them away from extremists. This war cannot be won by the numbers
(Photo: David Axe)
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Indeed, generals and policymakers aren’t speaking clearly on how it can be ‘won’ at all. Afghanistan is no longer a base for people who want to attack North America, and most of the country is run by people less wicked than the Taliban. Those are solid achievements. Destroying the Taliban in the Pashtun-majority provinces may not be possible.
“Success comes from winning the support of the locals and giving them hope, to turn them away from extremists. This war cannot be won by the numbers.”
I agree with this concept, but better intelligence lowers the risks of civilian casualties, beyond trigger happy soldiers as the jihadi propoganda machine would like you to think in their recruitment efforts. As was worded to my Kempai recently,
” A freindly fire incident with civilians wounded or killed could cause the villagers to assist insurgents eventually. Several freindly fires with civilian casualties in the same area or village, will lead to insurgency recruitment beyond just harboring the insurgents.”
I do agree with the newer generals line of thinking commanding this region about civilian casualties. I did a TRC thesis paper in 2008 based upon this concept of thinking. In that line of thought I had asked that Us Mil better socially map all payouts to families who had family members damaged or killed by war. This of course is whethere the US Mil did or did not shott,bomb, or maim the subjects of question. I had asked that we start using bio-metrics to better tag some of these people to see where they will resurface after given money by our soldiers, who just have had a family member of theirs killed. When we withdrawl out of the sandbox this compiled list could be added to our no-fly lists watchlists and families profiles so that we have an understanding ahead of time who may eventually be a higher probability in social modelling aspects of being recruited for jihad.
[...] The fight over videos of bombings in Afghanistan continues to simmer in some quarters. Bill Roggio claims that the military’s reluctance to release videos of successful attacks allows the Taliban to dictate the narrative of the struggle. Nathan Hodge argues that the Department of Defense is already transitioning toward that model and has footage of a recent attack. In the meantime, body counts return as a measure of battlefield progress. Michael Goldfarb welcomes the development; Kevin Knodell does not. [...]
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