War Is Boring

Yesterday the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure held a long hearing on the subject of the Coast Guard’s eight ill-fated 123-foot patrol boats and, more broadly, the ambitious but troubled Deepwater modernization scheme. The upgraded boats — the first major Deepwater effort — suffered hull cracks after being stretched by Northrop Grumman and this week the Coast Guard announced they would be decommissioned, at a loss of around $60 million and leaving a 15-percent shortfall in the service’s patrol force.

The 123 fiasco has led many to question the high degree of autonomy granted lead contractors Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, which together formed “Integrated Coast Guard Systems” and performed as “lead systems integrators” responsible for doling out Deepwater work to subcontractors, often including themselves. They played that role, that is, until this week, when Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen demoted ICGS to mere contractor status and returned the systems-integration job to his people, a change that will mean some new hires and a steep learning curve for the Coast Guard. 

The House hearing seemed to endorse the Coast Guard’s bold moves. One of the highlights was the testimony by former Lockheed Martin engineer Mike DeKort, who pointed out that the hull cracks were only half the 123s’ problems. They also suffered from bad wiring, a flawed security system and an insecure network — all flaws that Lockheed Martin knew about but ”self-certified” anyways in order to speed up work on the boats. Said DeKort in his written statement:

Had the hulls not cracked or the cracks not appeared for some time, ICGS would have delivered 49 123s and 91 [Short-Range Prosecutor boats] with the problems I describe. In addition to that, the Deepwater project is a “System of Systems” effort. What this means is that the contractor is directed to deliver solutions that would provide common equipment sets for all C4ISR systems. Said differently, all the equipments for like systems need to match unless there is an overwhelming reason not to. This means that every faulty system I have described here will be installed on every other maritime asset delivered over the lifetime of the effort. … I believe this could cripple the effectiveness of the Coast Guard and their ability to perform their missions for decades to come.

In other words, according to DeKort, the Coast Guard is lucky that the 123′s hulls cracked. If they hadn’t, the faulty upgrades to electronic and safety systems would have continued.

Now the contractors are on the defensive. One recent press release completely ignored the patrol boat brouhaha and sang the praises of the Deepwater aircraft and electronics:

The U.S. Coast Guard and Lockheed Martin continue to record successes across Deepwater aviation and information technology programs, which are modernizing or replacing the service’s entire fleet of nearly 200 helicopters and airplanes and providing an advanced command and control system that for the first time links all Coast Guard aircraft, ships and shore stations through a common operating picture.

And during the hearing, ICGS repeated this refrain, according to another press release:

“As Admiral Thad Allen has stated, both industry and the Coast Guard have taken steps to improve management, oversight and performance to ensure that the Deepwater program of tomorrow will be fundamentally better than the Deepwater program of today,” [Lockheed Martin vice president Leo Mackay] said. Mackay cited positive customer feedback regarding the nearly complete HH-65 helicopter re-engining program, the successful legacy cutter command and control upgrades, the recently opened National Security Cutter training center, and continued deliveries of the HC-144A maritime patrol aircraft, as examples of Deepwater accomplishments which are already making a productive impact throughout the Coast Guard.

To be fair, ICGS isn’t lying. Deepwater is a big program. And the patrol boats, so far, represent the only major failure. But what a failure it’s been …

The patrol boat fiasco has had knock-on effects in the Navy. The senior sea service, realizing that small, nimble boats are useful in the Persian Gulf, was hoping to take back a handful of 180-foot patrol boats it lent to the Coast Guard a few years back. But now the Coasties will keep those boats to mitigate the shortfall caused by the 123s’ decommissioning, potentially leaving the Navy short, too.

Related posts:

1. Coast Guard Eyes New Cutter
2. Warships International Fleet Review: U.S. Coast Guard’s Big Chill Demands New Tactics, Equipment
3. Coast Guard Continues Support in Wake of Haiti Earthquake, Part One
4. Coast Guard Continues Support in Wake of Haiti Earthquake, Part Two
5. Navy Amphib Diverts for Haiti Relief