Update: A few weeks ago, I asked readers to build their own navies over 30 years using just $12 billion a year, which is what the U.S. Navy has spent on new ships, on average, each of the last 12 years. To get the fleet up to the planned 313 ships, you’d need at least $22 billion a year, and that’s the figure many analysts have used in their discussions of the future fleet.
But now we’re hearing rumors that the Obama Administration might offer the Navy just $14 billion a year, which will necessitate a major re-think of force structure, and makes our little exercise a lot more relevant. So here it is again. I’ve updated the rules to add another $2 billion annually to your allowance. What would your Obama Navy look like?
“Tough choices and appetite suppression” are in order if the U.S. Navy is to build enough ships to meet regional commanders’ needs, U.S. Navy boss Admiral Gary Roughead said. The Navy for years has said it wants 313 ships, but with annual shipbuilding spending averaging just $12 billion, the sea service has found it difficult to build more than six or seven ships a year. With ships lasting an average of 30 years, that means a long-term fleet of just 200 hulls.
Last year I asked readers to design their own U.S. Air Force, using in-production aircraft and reasonable budget estimates. Now let’s do the same for the U.S. Navy. Given $12 $14 billion over 30 years, and only the ships in production today, what would you build, and why?
The rules are simple. You get 3,600 4,200 units (1 unit = $100 million). Ships are priced thusly, as taken from a wide range of sources:
130 : CVN-21 Ford-class aircraft carrier
20 : SSN-774 Virginia-class submarine
50 : DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer
25 : DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
6 : Littoral Combat Ship
15 : LPD-17 San Antonio-class assault ship
40: LHA-6 America-class assault ship
5 : T-AKE Lewis and Clark-class logistics ship
2 : Joint High-Speed Vessel
Note: Yes, I know there are no next-gen cruisers, ballistic-missile subs, command ships or auxiliaries on the price list. Can’t be totally comprehensive here. Besides, the CG(X) overlaps with DDG-1000, right, and future boomers and auxiliaries will be based on SSN-774s and T-AKEs, respectively, right? Just nod your head and play along.
(Photo: me)
Related posts:
Very well. 8 carriers, 50 destroyers, 40 submarines, 8 LHA-6, 10 LPD-7, 8 T-AKEs. 132 ships.
I believe we should keep up the number of LHAs on the grounds that they can be used as auxiliary carriers and soften the blow that comes from reducing the number of supercarriers. In this force structure, the only ship that isn’t reduced in numbers is the LPD. I justify this on the grounds that if I cancel the LCS, I will need an offshore platform to launch light craft and special operations missions in coastal waters-the “mother ship” concept.
Right now there are 61 submarines off all types in commission. I really don’t see how we can keep that force with only 12 billion a year to play with. If the USN would consider buying advanced diesel submarines we could, but that’s not in the rules, so we get fewer ships. Both the Zumwalt and the LCS offer poor value, in my opinion. The LCS appears to promise more units, and I like more units, but I believe its too big for genuine coastal work and too fast and lightly armed for escort duty. Again, a real frigate is not offered as a choice, which means that 30 frigates (and 22 cruisers) disappear from the force structure.
In their place we get fifty Burkes, which is just two units shy of what we have right now. For every Burke you cancel you could have four LCSs. But how many coastal zones do you plan to fight in at once? I believe that this sort of warfare really is best served by larger, slower ships launching fast boats from out to sea and covered/assisted by destroyers.
This would not be a bad navy. It would be a navy that had a preponderance of force over any possible adversary. It’s not a navy that can fight multiple wars against all enemies at once without allies but I don’t think it’s wise to try. The emphasis in my force structure is on large, oceangoing ships well-suited to convoy protection and force projection. By “force projection” I mean “strike.” Policing, nation-building, occupation duty, and even omnipresent “sea control” gets shorted.
But isn’t that the problem with all these paper fleets? So much of the force structure depends on what you think the Navy is for, on what you think the military is for, on what you consider “national defense.” The Navy has to commit to a long-term shipbuilding plan while the electorate vacillates between isolationism and remaking the world. It’s pretty easy to get caught wrong-footed in such an environment but there is wisdom in the words of the senator that protested the building of the first sealift ships back in the 1960′s: “If we have ships that can go anywhere and do anything, then we’ll always be going places and doing things!” They don’t make conservatives like that anymore.
James,
Interesting. Of course, my rules for this exercise are based on the last decade’s average shipbuilding budget. The Navy is banking on getting more money to build a bigger fleet. I want to see what people do in a worst-case-scenario kind of environment. I’m going to start working on my fleet tonight.
My fleet comprises:
6 x CVN-21
40 x SSN-774
20 x LCS
10 x JHSV
26 x T-AKE
20 x LPD-17
10 x LHA-6
6 x DDG-1000
32 x DDG-51
That’s 170 ships. My ships will deploy in carrier battle groups (CVBG), expeditionary strike groups (ESG) and littoral strike groups (LSG), with extra SSNs for independent patrols and conversion to boomers, plus extra T-AKEs for pre-positioning and the logistics train.
6 x CVBG. Each CVBG = 1 x CVN-21, 1 x DDG-1000, 2 x DDG-51, 1 x SSN, 1 T-AKE
10 x ESG. Each ESG = 1 x LHA-6, 2 x LPD-17, 2 x DDG-51, 1 s SSN, 1 x T-AKE
10 x LSG. Each LSG = 2 x LCS, 1 x JHSV
Philosophically, this fleet reflects my desire to retain significant amphibious and submarine forces, while cutting back on CVNs and their escorts for cash savings while also adding a small littoral force. And I do not skimp on the logistics fleet.
CVN-21: 7
SSN-774: 2
DDG-1000: 0
DDG-51: 65
LCS: 0
LPD-17: 18
LHA-6: 11
T-AKE: 21
Joint HSV: 5
Lotsa Sysadmin / Africa Partner Station capability, would trade a dozen destroyers for two dozen real frigates.
Please note that’s supposed to be 12 subs:
CVN-21: 7
SSN-774: 12
DDG-1000: 0
DDG-51: 65
LCS: 0
LPD-17: 18
LHA-6: 11
T-AKE: 21
Joint HSV: 5
Axe: I agree I’m probably short on logistics ships, but it would be possible to trade a couple of destroyers for 10 more T-AKEs. I kept up the destroyer numbers on the grounds that they could be the basis for a large frigate design. I think the amphibious force I outlined is very near to current capabilities, since the new ships are larger and more capable than the ones in use right now. Yet I think that such force will be used more sparingly in the future as the US retreats into “Post-Iraq Syndrome.” At the very least, the US will be much more careful to mass larger military commitments from allies before jumping into the fire. Darfur and Somalia are good examples of this.
With this in mind, it’s worth asking what the USN brings to our alliances that is truly unique and difficult for smaller countries to replicate. The carriers and the large force of nuclear submarines come to mind. Amphibious and coastal forces are how navies project power, to be sure, but they are also easier capabilities for small navies to build and and master. They are also easier for the USN to improvise in an emergency.
10 CVNs
50 SSNs
0 DDG-1000
21 DDG-51
21 LCS
18 LPD
6 LHA
21 T-AKE
23 JHSV
170 ships. I’d want to emphasize this is a WORST case scenario, with minimum AEGI defense for the surface fleet and it’s just over 3600 units. This is the “no more peer competitors” fleet. More realistically, I’d triple the number of DDGs which would “only” increase the cost to 3700 units and produce 210 hulls. To get above 300 ships would either require a massive move away from large hulls and a *huge* LCS/JHSV buy, or a pretty meaty ramping up of investment.
CVN-21: 12
SSN-774: 2
DDG-1000: 0
DDG-51: 70
LCS: 0
LPD-17: 19
LHA-6: 10
T-AKE: 12
Joint HSV: 0
Kevin,
An aviation-heavy force. Interesting. Just curious, can you tell me the philosophy behind giving up on submarines?
Moose,
How are you defending your high-value surface units with so few destroyers? Are you using submarines as escorts? What about air-defense of the surface groups?
David,
Doesn’t it make more sense to put the DDG-1000s with the ESGs? I realize you only have 6 of them, but they will get a lot more use there than CVBGs far out to sea.
B. Smitty,
Actually, I was imagining my DDG-1000s as full-up air defenders with all the radar upgrades to take advantage of SM-2 and SM-3 missiles. That’s why I priced them at $5 billion. With all the upgrades, a DDG-1000 is a lot like the conceptual CG(X), with excellent air-defense capabilities.
David, with the bare minimum fleet I’d assign one Aegis ship to each CVBG (Carrier, resuply, and the DDG), one to each of 6 ESGs (LHA/D, 3 LPDs, resupply, and the DDG), 5 additional to float between supporting LSGs and reinforcing battle groups as required. All the Burkes would devote 100% of their VLS to Air Defense, with the SSNs and SSGNs taking over the entire Cruise Missile load. The ESGs could augment the Burkes’ VLS cells by having the planned LPD cells added and filled with ESSM. Like I said, this is a worst case scenario to fit within the current budget without sacrificing a large number of carriers. I don’t think less than 1o carriers is viable even if LHA could really function as a CVE.
David,
They’d be air defenders with fewer VLS cells than a DDG-51 and two big, expensive AGSs that they would never use.
They also have an ASW suite optimized for the littorals, not open ocean, where the CVBG will spend most of its time.
You’d be better off replacing the 6 DDG-1000s with 12 DDG-51s, giving each CVBG four escorts and 112 more VLS cells.
Just MHO.
Prioritizations:
CVNs must be produced continuously, or we lose the capability to make them at all. Therefore, 10 CVNs are required.
SSNs must be produced at a fairly high rate for similar reasons.
CSGs must be adequately protected.
ESGs are a nice to have item.
Logistics support is a requirement.
So, my chosen force is as follows:
CVN-78: 10
SSN-774: 24
DDG-1000: 0
DDG-51: 48
LCS: 0
LPD-17: 9
LHA-6: 9
T-AKE: 25
Joint HSV: 0
CSGs consist of:
CVN-78, SSN-774, 3x DDG-51
ESGs consists of:
LHA-6, LPD-17, SSN-774, 2x DDG-51
Extra cash would be used to produce more SSNs and another ESG if such were available.
All,
What’s interesting here is that the consensus seems to be: either keep strong aviation forces, or keep strong amphibious forces, but you probably can’t do both — and strictly coastal forces are an afterthought.
Me, I’d favor amphibious forces over aviation.
Ohirara,
Your ESG would require changing the USMC MAGTF organization. An MEU would have to shrink significantly to fit on two ships.
David,
Isn’t this over a 30 year period? At a build rate of 1 CVN every five years, we should only expect to build 6. So I think your solution keeps us at 10 CVBGs overall.
Ok, because I’m ornery, I’ve broken the rules and added a few of my own ship types:
8: FFH(X) – A direct Perry-class frigate replacement focusing on USW (MIW & ASW), but with SPY-3, a small VLS, and a Mk45
Mod 4
1: OPV(X) – A ~2000-ton OPV similar to the NZ Protector OPV, focusing on MIO, COIN, anti-piracy, GFS, and MIW in
permissive environments
2.5: T-AO – Just your regular Kaiser-class oiler
2.5: MRV(X) – A small multipurpose sealift ship based roughly on the HMNZS Canterbury MRV – essentially a 9000 ton, LPD-17-lite built to commercial standards. It has limited RAS and VERTREP capabilities to support OPVs and FFHs at sea, and can carry a Marine riverine squadron or small Marine infantry unit and its equipment or NGOs or any combination.
I started with David’s fleet, but subtracted 3 DDG-1000s and 20 LCSs and added 2 more JHSVs,
6 x CVN-21
40 x SSN-774
12 x JHSV
26 x T-AKE
20 x LPD-17
10 x LHA-6
3 x DDG-1000
32 x DDG-51
With those funds I add,
18 x FFH(X)
36 x OPV(X)
12 x MRV(X)
6 x T-AO
for a total of 219 ships.
These ships will deploy in CVBGs, ESGs, Surface Action Groups (SAGs), and a new group I call a Littoral Operations Group (LOG). LOGs will be regionally based, and form the backbone of GFS station fleets and counter-piracy/COIN/MIO task forces, relieving high-end forces to focus on warfighting missions.
SAGs will be task-organized with CVBGs, ESGs or LOGs, depending on need.
6 x CVBG. Each CVBG = 1 x CVN-21, 2 x DDG-51, 1 x SSN, 1 x T-AKE, 1 x T-AO
10 x ESG. Each ESG = 1 x LHA-6, 2 x LPD-17, 2 x DDG-51, 1 x SSN, 1 x T-AKE
3 x SAG. Each SAG = 1 x DDG-1000, 2 x FFH(X)
12 x LOG. Each LOG = 1 x FFH(X), 1 x MRV, 1 x JHSV, 6 x OPV(X)
Overall I’m 9 units over budget.
I’m not happy with only having 2 x DDG-51s per CVBG. I would prefer to have 3 or more escorts, but the budget realities preclude this. I could dump the 3 remaining DDG-1000s,for 6 x DDG-51s, but the first three Zumwalts are far enough along in development that I feel they should be finished.
Sorry for not following the rules David. I just wanted to highlight what is possible with some outside-the-box thinking.
I think the reason coastal forces are an expendable afterthought is because they don’t exist yet and therefore have no constituency to defend them. Or perhaps, to be less cynical, because their value is unknown compared to extant forces.
My proposal was probably the most conservative: a smaller version of the Navy we have now. That might seem unimaginative but it is also the most likely. I don’t believe we will give up all submarines or, for that matter, scrap all amphibious units to resurrect our lost 12-carrier Navy. I do believe that the Marines can and will embrace the coastal warfare role in the absence of the LCS and develop tactics that enable them to do the same job by operating boats and helicopters from their amphibious platforms.
I take issue with the assertion that we need to build a carrier every three years “or lose the capability to construct them.” Russia hasn’t built a carrier in twenty years but no one doubts they could put one together if they really wanted to. Ditto Britain. Building one carrier every four or five years is plenty.
B. Smitty,
I like it. I, too, wish the Navy had plans for a genuine frigate. It’s not that I don’t like LCS — it’s good for what it’s good for — but the niche for frigates hasn’t gone away.
Your choices seem mostly geared toward a Blue Water conventional navy, but still I list:
75 Virginias
50 JHSV
30 LCS
6 Ford CV
30 DDG-51
20 T-AKE
5 America LHD
I’m over by 10 units but we get a 216 Big Ship Navy. This should only be the foundation for an expanded riverene/coastal force of perhaps 200-300 small ships ranging from patrol boats to corvette of 1500 tons or less.
And you know an arsenal ship could replace at least 5 DDG-51s for the same cost and far less crew, plus subbing for carriers in a low threat environment.
[...] Build Your Own US Navy! This is fun, though not geared for a 21st Century littoral strategy. From War is Boring. [...]
David,
I think the LCS’s limitations outweigh its advantages.
A true frigate could be built to perform MIW and ASW without changing modules, and have enough residual AAW and ASuW capability to defend itself and ships nearby from a handful of cruise missiles. It doesn’t have to be a big, expensive AAW frigate like the Spanish F-100. We already have Burkes for that job.
I don’t know if $800 million is the right price for such a ship, but the average cost for an FFG-7 in FY09 dollars was $690 million, so my FFH(X) would have $110 million worth of wiggle room.
I think an important aspect of the plan is the use of pure commercial-spec ships for the LOGs. New Zealand is buying Protector OPVs for around $60 million (USD). These are helicopter-capable ships, with hangars. They are not little speedboats with no range or endurance. They can launch and recover helos in SS5 and can survive up to SS9. That’s not bad for a 1700-ton ship.
Such an OPV(X) could easily sail from Diego Garcia to the Gulf of Aden alone, or as part of a LOG, perform counter-piracy patrols there for a week, and return without any support. Adding an MRV, T-AKE and/or T-AO could greatly extend its endurance.
Foreign countries may also find non-warship OPVs and MRVs more palatable, which could open up more regional basing opportunities.
If we want to have a 313-ship Navy in today’s budget climate, I think we will have to explore options such as these.
Ok, I’ll play.
Doctrine.
I will follow Corbett and divide the Navy’s mission into two categories – Obtaining Command; and Exploiting Command.
Obtaining Command requires the ability to defeat the Battle Fleets of the next two largest Navies either combined or separated. Or to conduct a supported blockade of the coastline of two nations.
Exploiting Command requires two things:
The ability to interdict and/or protect every major shipping line on the planet;
and the ability to project power past the coastline via the provision of amphibious support.
Defeating Battle Fleets requires:
– An adequate number of heavy capital ships (read: carriers)
Blockade requires:
– Sufficient submarines and frigates to provide observation
– A number of heavy destroyers on which the light forces can fall back should they be attacked
Commerce interdiction/protection requires:
– A large flotilla
– A few destroyers/frigates to provide protection.
Amphibious support requires:
– Amphibious ships
– Escorts against Air and Light-Naval spoiling attacks
– Ample logistics support
– Amphibious Strike (ie. F-35B’s staging off CVN/LHA)
– A covering fleet (provided by the battle fleet)
Add to this a 5th Generation capability requiring:
– Hospital/Engineering ships
– Logistics support
– Shallow Draft Patrol/Goodwill ships
– Light Escorts
Forces.
The lack of a Frigate makes this exercise as written pointless. So I am going to add to my list the Spanish F-100 current price USD$600mil (FFG @ 6 points). Aust’ and NZ are doing the integration work with Aegis, so that should allow us to include an FFAW @ 7 points. The lack of auxiliaries is also a problem so I am going to pick up the High Endurance Cutter from the Coast Guard, add back the single Harpoon launcher, and designate it a High-Endurance Corvette (HECG @ 1 point).
Battle Fleet
As the US is the only Navy to own CVN’s, an adequate battle fleet is 1 CVN per theatre, plus a spare to allow for ‘accidents’. Yes we would like more, but we are doing this on the cheap and there isn’t room for luxuries. So with The Med’, Indian Ocean, Pacific, that’s 4 CVN’s with escorts sufficient for 3 Carrier Groups.
Carrier Group:
1 CVN @ 130 130
1 SSN @ 20 20
3 DDG @ 25 75
5 FFAW @ 7 28
2 TAKE @ 5 10
12 Ships 263 points
Blockade:
SSN’s and patrol aircraft off an LHA provide the observation forces. FFAW’s to give enemy ASW forces pause, and provide on-station Air Defence. DDG’s and F-35′s (off an LHA), to provide cover against minor sorties. You want to be able to blockade 2 coasts simultaneously without drawing down from other parts of the fleet, so 2 Blockade Groups.
Blockade Group:
1 LHA @ 40 40
2 DDG @ 25 50
10 SSN @ 20 200
10 FFAW @ 7 70
1 TAKE @ 5 5
24 Ships 365 points
Commerce Protection:
Anti-Piracy, Anti-Smuggling, Trade-Interdiction, to perform these tasks all you need is the ability to sink an unarmed ship or boat should they refuse to let you board them. Add just enough heavy support to discourage interference, and you will want 1 per major shipping lane. So call that S.America, Caribbean, W.Europe, Med, W.Africa, E.Africa, P.Gulf, NE.Indian, Singapore, China Sea, S.Pacific, N.Pacific. So 12 Commerce Protection Flotillas
Commerce Protection Flotilla:
1 DDG @ 25 25
4 FFAW @ 7 28
10 JHSV @ 2 20
15 HECG @ 1 15
1 TAKE @ 5 5
31 Ships 93 points
Amphibious Operations:
Enough amphibious forces to make a difference, strike power to support them, escorts to protect them, and logistics to maintain them. 3 Groups will allow 2 operations while maintaining the threat of a third.
Amphibious Strike Force:
1 LHA @ 40 40
3 LPD @ 15 45
2 DDG @ 25 50
9 LCS @ 6 54
3 TAKE @ 5 15
18 Ships 204 points
5th Generation Warfare:
This amounts to enough manpower and logistics to support emergency relief efforts when required. Enough patrol strength to provide real assistance in places such as circa 1996 Somalia when a US Navy based Coast Guard for Somalia might have made a difference. Enough small vessels that meaningful training exercises with even the smallest nations become possible. Plus light escorts. I would like to have 3 (Africa, Asia, Americas), but have to settle for 2 for cost reasons. As an aside, I am a little concerned at the lack of Air Defense available in the LCS, and might want to consider a mix of LCS and FFAW instead.
Humanitarian Relief Group:
2 LPD @ 15 30
6 LCS @ 6 36
5 JHSV @ 2 10
20 HECG @ 1 20
2 TAKE @ 5 10
35 Ships 106 points
So in total we have:
3 CG @ 263 + 1 CVN @ 130 37 Ships 919 Points
2 BG @ 365 48 Ships 730 Points
12 CPF @ 93 372 Ships 1116 Points
3 ASF @ 204 54 Ships 612 Points
2 HRG @ 106 70 Ships 212 Points
Total: 22 Groups 561 Ships 3589 Points
In terms of Ships:
CVN-21 4
LHA-6 5
DDG-51 31
SSN-774 23
FFAW 83
LCS 39
J-HSV 130
HECG 220
LPD-17 13
T-AKE 33
DDG-1000 0 – Not interested until it can decide if it is supposed to be a DDG, a CCG, a BBG, or a LCS. It really isn’t possible to do more than 2, and really you only want one.
If I had extra budget I would in order of priority add:
1 extra CVN
1 extra LHA per BG
1 extra HRG
A dedicated Logistics Group of 10 T-AKE’s + 20 FFAW escorts
1 extra CG
2 extra CPF
for an extra 1052 points, at which point I start to run out of missions for ships, but I suppose you can keep adding CPF’s and HRG’s to your hearts content.
Andrae,
I seriously doubt we could buy F-100s for only $700 million. That’s only $100 mil more than an LCS!
The Spanish price I’ve seen for their F-100s was €750 mil ($1000 mil USD). The Aussies are paying $1.8 billion for there’s. My wild guess for a USN F-100 was $1.3 billion, assuming a larger production run.
Just MHO.
B.Smitty,
Well Spain bought their first 4 F-100′s for USD$560m in 1997-2003. And their recent purchase of a fifth frigate + 4 BAM Frigates cost USD$1.4b (2006). Norway’s F-100′s cost ~USD$600m by all accounts. The Aussie unit price of AUD$1.3b is for a total of 3 Frigates produced locally, and includes more than just the ships themselves (how much more isn’t public). So while I’m happy to be corrected, I suspect my costing is reasonable.
Hmm,
Well I’d be ecstatic to buy F-100s for $700 million, it just seems very low. That’s three F-100s for the price of one Burke! I just don’t see it. You sure those prices included all of the weapon systems?
The deagel.com page on the F-100 lists a unitary cost of 750 million Euros ($1 billion)
http://www.deagel.com/Frigates/F100-Alvaro-de-Bazan_a000423001.aspx
Additionally, adding all of the requisite NVR and USN-specific changes will drive up the price.
Do you know how much the BAM ships cost? They look similar to, but a bit larger than the Protector OPV I’ve mentioned. If so, all four BAMs may only cost $2-400 million total.
Because I can’t get enough of this kind of thing, I took a stab at an alternate structure.
With this new composition I had one overriding goal: to fit a smaller, conventional, CATOBAR carrier into the fleet, while
not eliminating the CVN.
In this concept, a CV(X) would replace the LHA in ESGs. It would be broadly similar to the French PA1 and UK CVF in size and
capability, but would require more reconfigurability to support a full fixed-wing airwing, or Marines and their equipment
and helicopters, depending on the mission.
Recently, there have been a number of ESG deployments which went to sea without Marines. In addition, there is growing
consensus that CVNs supporting operations in Iraq are overkill today. An ESG centered around a CV(X) could
perform the same mission, freeing up CVBGs for other tasks.
Today, an ESG is normally comprised of three ships:
- one large deck LHA or LHD
- one LPD
- one LSD
Replacing the LHA/D with a CV(X) may reduce the overall cargo cube, vehicle square and Marine billets available, so to
compensate I added an extra LPD-17. My new ESG is as follows:
- one CV(X)
- three LPD-17s
The Marines and Navy have expressed the desire to have a fourth amphibious ship per ESG anyway, to support split operations.
Adding the CV(X) would have other benefits:
- It would allow the USMC and USN to forego the F-35 program completely, and consolidate Navy and Marine tacair around the
F/A-18E/F (and J-UCAS down the road). This alone would save tens of billions of dollars.
- It would allow ESGs to carry force multipliers such as E-2C/Ds, EA-18G, and tanker pods for the F-18E/F.
- Three LPD-17s per ESG would increase the number of LCACs over an LHA-based ESG.
- Since the CV(X) is larger than an LHA, it could carry a larger number of aircraft, more fuel, more munitions, and so on.
Drawbacks to this approach include:
- Lowering the build rate of CVNs from one every 5 years (10 overall) to one ever 7.5 (6-7 overall). I assume no cost
increases as a result, which may be very optimistic.
- Designing another large, complex warship, with the associated program and cost risks.
- Potentially reducing the space available for Marines and their gear in an ESG, or providing sub-optimal stowage.
- Eliminating fixed-wing STOVL aircraft from Marine inventories with the retirement of the Harrier.
- Postponing the introduction of stealth in to the fleet until J-UCAS.
In the end, we would have more fixed-wing carriers overall (15-16 vs 10), though potentially fewer fighter aircraft at sea
due to the competing demands on the CV(X) to be an LHA as well as a carrier.
Determining a reasonable cost for a CV(X) is difficult. As a reference, I used the UK CVF program cost of $3.2 billion per
ship (USD). Since my CV(X) will need to be more configurable, have catapults, be built to USN NVRs, and have a host of
USN/USMC-specific systems installed, I just about doubled the CVF price to $6 billion USD. This is also roughly half the
price of a Ford-class CVN. If it were built to amphibious ship instead of warship standards, and we were more stingy with
the combat systems, we might get the price down to $4-5 billion. But for this exercise, I’ll stick with $6 billion each.
In addition to adding a CV(X), my new composition increased the number of escorts to three DDG-51s per CVBG and ESG. The
cost of doing so was the elimination of the SAGs and their DDG-1000s, lowering the ESG count from 10 to 9, and the LOG count
from 12 to 10.
9 CV(X)
4 CVN-21
39 SSN-774
0 LCS
12 JHSV
23 T-AKE
27 LPD-17
39 DDG-51
19 FFH(X)
60 OPV(X)
4 T-AO
10 MRV
245 ships total. (I had far too few OPV(X)s in my last post)
4 CVBGs with 1 CVN, 3 DDG-51s,1 SSN, 1 T-AKE, 1 T-AO
9 ESGs with 1 CV(X), 3 LPD-17s, 3 DDG-51s, 1 FFH(X), 1 SSN, 1 T-AKE
10 LOGS with 1 FFH(X), 1 MRV, 1 JHSV, 6 OPV(X)
Sorry about the formatting issues. I should’ve proofed after cut-n-pasting from Notepad.
My fleet under the old rules included:
6 x CVN-21
40 x SSN-774
20 x LCS
10 x JHSV
26 x T-AKE
20 x LPD-17
10 x LHA-6
6 x DDG-1000
32 x DDG-51
With my $2-billion-a-year Obama bump, I added:
1 x CVN
4 x SSN
30 x LCS
15 x JHSV
8 x T-AKE
2 x LPD
4 x DDG
The LCS and JHSV are for more coverage of the littorals and use as “mini-amphibs.” I’ve added T-AKEs and LPD-17s to support these littoral gators. For blue-water ops, I added some subs, plus one carrier and a few more destroyers to escort the carrier and other ships.
With the Obama bump, my fleet grows from 170 to 234 vessels. This represents a small decrease in blue-water power and a big increase in littoral power compared to today’s fleet.
CVN-21: 8
SSN-774: 18
DDG-1000: 0
DDG-51: 79
LCS: 0
LPD-17: 18
LHA-6: 11
T-AKE: 21
Joint HSV: 5
Just added a little blue water to my amphib force. Would still love to trade a dozen Burkes for 25 frigates.
See my previous post for the doctrine used to determine this fleet. My updated fleet is 632 ships, more than twice the desired target of 313.
I’m still a little bothered by the lack of any escort and patrol classes in the options, this biases fleet design towards battleships and away from flotilla. At minimum an escort frigate and a patrol corvette are required. I would also love to replace 4 of the LHA’s with true CVE’s. I follow Smitty’s costings:
FFE : ~4200t Frigate, Air Defence and ASW specialist escort.
OPV : ~2000t Corvette, similar to the NZ Protector OPV.
I also adopted the T-AO oiler, and MRV ~9000t light amphib.
Summary:
CVN-21 5
LHA-40 7
DDG-51 31
SSN-774 23
FFE 115
LPD-17 13
LCS 23
MRV 10
JHSV 94
OPV 210
T-AKE 43
T-AO 58
Total 632
Detail:
3 Carrier Groups @ 288 for 864:
CVN 1
DDG 3
SSN 1
FFE 6
T-AKE 2
T-AO 2
2 Blockade Groups @ 420 for 840:
LHA 2
DDG 2
SSN 10
FFE 10
T-AKE 1
T-AO 2
12 Commerce Protection Flotilla @ 96 for 1152:
DDG 1
FFE 4
JHSV 7
OPV 15
T-AKE 1
T-AO 2
3 Amphibious Strike Group @ 214 for 642:
LHA 1
DDG 2
FFE 3
LPD 3
LCS 5
MSV 2
T-AKE 3
T-AO 2
2 Humanitarian Relief Groups @ 99 for 198:
LPD 2
LCS 4
MRV 2
JHSV 5
OPV 15
T-AKE 2
T-AO 2
1 Logistics Group @ 245 for 245:
FFE 20
T-AKE 10
T-AO 14
2 Relief Carriers @ 130 for 260:
CVN 2
If a CVE is available they would replace all the LHA’s in the BG’s.
6 x CVN-21 (780): (You don’t *need* 10 Aircraft Carriers to patrol the world and provide a rapid and adequate response to a major crisis. The Royal Navy proved that by taking the Falklands on a shoestring, 6 new Ford Carriers and gradually pay off the existing ones as each new one comes on stream. With the amount of firepower on an average Ford-class Carrier you could just have three and still dominate the seas.)
40 x SSN-774 (800): A strong submarine force is vital for fleet defence as well as to confuse the enemy. Again, HMS Conqurer and the Falklands. By sinking the Belgrano, she virtually forced the Argentine fleet to port on her own. That is how valuable a decent submarine manned by a well trained crew can be.
10 x DDG-1000 (500): Now, these you DO need. By only selecting six David, you’re painting yourself into the same corner that the MoD in the UK is by only building Six Type 45s. It doesn’t matter that there are going to be lots more DDG-51 to fill the gap, you need a bare minimum of the best Destroyer you have to make sure that you can spread them across the globe and still have a reserve in case of emergency, parts, training, etc. Just having six for fleet defence and nothing more is cutting it way too fine.
25 x DDG-51 (625)
15 x LCS (90)
15 x LPD-17 (225)
10 x LHA-6 (400)
35 (175) x T-AKE: These new logistics ships are really interesting in their modular design and uses. Build as many as you can.
10 x (20) JHSV
Total Fleet = 166
Total cost = 3615
There you go! Under budget and yet still delivering a strong and robust navy which can still sink the navies of Europe, China and Russia combined. Happy days, lets go celebrate.
If you add any patrol ships..you know..like the ones which could be used off the coast of Aden right now, then these can be paid for by the huge savings I’ve engineered.
Tell Obama I’ll be on my mobile and skype tonight.
This DDG-1000 needs to go. Its a waste and the USN will only get maybe 2 or 3 and have to sacrifice a updated Arleigh Burkes. I dont know about the LCS, its off to an awful start. it looks like a big lightly armed ship. I think the navy would be better off with an off the shelf light frigate or corvette type. There are plenty of designs out there.
The survice life of CVN is 50 years and this is a 30 year plan. So you need to build only 6 to keep 10, or only 5 to keep 8, or 4 to keep 6.
[...] President Barack Obama will unveil his 2010 budget on Thursday, and the military expects big cuts to their spending plans. How big? The Navy was hoping for as much as $26 billion a year to build ships, and will probably get only $14 billion. The Air Force is desperate for 60 more F-22 fighters at a cost of nearly $10 billion, and the only way they’ll get them is with commiserate cuts to other programs. The Army is bracing itself for a major slash to its pet project, the $160-billion Future Combat Systems family of technologies. [...]
Carrier Strike: 250 (7 hulls)
1x CVN-21 = 130
3x DDG-51 = 75
2x SSN-774 = 40
1x T-AKE = 5
Amphibious Assault: 126 (9 hulls)
1x LHA-6 = 40
2x LPD-17 = 30
3x JHSV = 6
1x DDG-51 = 25
1x SSN-774 = 20
1x T-AKE = 5
Littoral Interdiction: 44 (8 hulls)
7x LCS = 42
1x JHSV = 2
10x Carrier Strike = 2500 (70 hulls)
10x Amphibious Assault = 1260 (90 hulls)
10x Littoral Interdiction = 640 (80 hulls)
Total cost: 4200
Total number of hulls: 240
Fleet totals:
10x CVN-21
40x DDG-51
30x SSN-774
10x LHA-6
20x LPD-17
70x LCS
40x JHSV
20x T-AKE
= 240 hulls
Okay, so it’s not a 313 ship/boat navy … but that’s kinda sorta what the whole exercise is pointing out now isn’t it? I could reach the 313 ship/boat navy “ideal” by sacrificing two carrier strike groups and two amphibious assault groups, and then plowing the savings gained back into littoral interdiction groups. You then wind up with a 8/8/27 mix of groups, rather than the 10/10/10 I’ve got here, for a total of 344 ships/boats (and I’m not sure I’d really want 55% of the hulls in the water to be LCS types in such a scenario).
The thing is though, groups of 10 like this are really convenient for deployment rotations. It lets you keep 3 or 4 groups of each type on active deployment at all times around the world, depending on operations tempo, while permitting sufficient downtime on the other groups for replenishment, training, R&R and SLEP. That allows a “permanent” force projection stance to be maintained, along with a high degree of readiness.
No there are no Zumwalts in this plan.
With the limits of ship selection-No frigates, cruisers, corvette types, diesel subs or other amphib types other support types this was my best mix –
10 CVN-21
30 SSN-774
12 DD-1000
30 DD-51
25 LCS
20 JHSV
18 T-AKE
10 LPA
18 LPD
This works out to exactly 4200 units.It gives enough support ships to CVBG and ESG with enough smaller vessels for littoral /coastal groups and preserving a respectable submarine arm and support force. I personally think the navy should gear more toward frigates and corvette types to blend with LCS’s and patrol craft.Influence Squadrons are far to weak to intervene in coastal support with a single DD and 1 LCS and could easily be over matched .
Can we get a real chance to build a balanced ,larger fleet with Cruisers ,Frigates ,Corvettes ,Diesel subs ,and full pallet of amphib ships and Coastal Patrol Ships and Support ships. Some of the previous mentioned suggestions for frigates for example,but there is no agreement on points/cost.I think you would see some great ideas!
[...] Here is Axe’s original post for reference. I think I will stick with his original estimate that the USN will average $14 billion annually for now. [...]
[...] is a little game that was originally conceived by David Axe at War is Boring, and which New Wars has put its own spin upon. For this particular post we will play around with [...]