The Diplomat: China’s Overhyped Sub Threat


Categorie: Asia, China, David Axe, Naval, The Diplomat |
Tags: , ,

Song-class submarine.

Song-class submarine.


It was the U.S. Navy’s biggest jolt in years. On October 26, 2006, a Chinese Song-class attack submarine quietly surfaced within nine miles of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk as the 80,000-ton-diplacement vessel sailed on a training exercise in the East China Sea between Japan and Taiwan.

The Song-class vessel, displacing 2,200 tons, was close enough to hit the Kitty Hawk with one of its 18 homing torpedoes. None of the carrier’s roughly dozen escorting warships detected the Song until it breached the surface.

The Song’s provocative appearance was, for the Americans, “as big a shock as the Russians launching Sputnik,” one NATO official told Britain’s Daily Mail newspaper, referring to the Soviet Union’s launch of the first-ever space satellite in 1957. “This could well have escalated into something that was very unforeseen,” said Adm. Bill Fallon, then commander of U.S. Pacific forces.

The incident underscored the then explosive growth of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s undersea force, as well as Beijing’s apparent intention to wrestle the Western Pacific away from the once-dominant U.S. Navy. “The Chinese are building a credible submarine force which will make it very difficult for the U.S. Navy to maintain sea control dominance in or near coastal waters off of China,” warned Rear Adm. Hank McKinney, former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s submarine force.

Of particular concern to American defense officials was the projected introduction, over the coming decade, of up to 20 new nuclear-powered attack submarines, known as “SSNs,” that are an order of magnitude more capable than the Song class. “The acquisition of increasing numbers of SSNs would give it (the PLAN) the ability to contest U.S. naval forces farther from China’s shores,” Thomas Mahnken wrote in China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, edited by Naval War College professor Andrew Erickson and published in 2007.

Yet nearly five years later, McKinney’s and Mahnken’s alarm has been proved false. The PLAN still possesses a tiny number of nuclear-powered submarines. The Songs and other short-range diesel boats remain the backbone of China’s undersea force. Beijing’s production of new submarines has declined andthe PLAN’s overall undersea fleet is likely to contract in coming years. “I don’t think they know whether they want to make the full-up commitment it would take to do this (submarine) thing right,” Owen Cote, Jr., an analyst at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says of the Chinese.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy and its Pacific allies have crafted plans to stabilize or even grow their own submarine fleets. In 2006, Western observers feared the undersea balance of power in the Pacific would tilt. In a sense, they were right. It has tilted – back towards the United States and its allies.

How that happened speaks volumes about China’s evolution as a regional power.

Read the rest at The Diplomat.


One Response to “The Diplomat: China’s Overhyped Sub Threat”

  1. MO says:

    While comments have devolved into bashing the Fear China or not arguments, let’s apply an eye for rationality that the author doesn’t seem to appreciate.

    We can be-little China’s sub force for it’s slanted ASuW mission stance but the following questions/facts mean we have to take them seriously since subs are just one vector of an enveloping anti-access strategy:
    -Yes, we have 70, but how many are in the Pacific? Of those available, what are their transit times?
    -How many days do we have in a Taiwan/island invasion scenario to respond?
    -Chinese subs do their ASuW mission VERY-well and are the BEST equipped ASuW force in the world; impact: Carrier Denial until attrited, eventually we may have to draw a 200mile missile circle around each AOU for a deployed sub…
    -The reach of each sub’s weapons capability is significant; Think of them as mobile missile launchers, not Torpedo launchers
    -Couple this with significant surveillance capability, offensive maneuviring ballistic weapons, it is a significant, dispersed threat if it deploys that can deny access to the region
    -Author belittle’s diesel boat capability to project power… uh, we sailed accross the pacific in diesel boats to deliver substantial blows to the Japanese in… 1941-45. There is no comparison between diesel boat and SSN for their ASW role, so don’t let me support the Milan Vego line of we need deisel boats… waste of money when you look at the costs and limitations… unless we sell to numerous countries.
    -I question the author’s belittling comments concerning communications to submarines. China is a huge country. How well do we really know their redundancy by using soda straw analysis of overhead imagery?
    -You could write a more balanced piece than this with an appreciation for the completeness with which China has develped the anti-access area denial strategy

Leave a Reply